Brighton switched between a diamond and a 3-1-6 formation and Spurs had no answer

Considering we are midway through the highest-scoring Premier League season yet — in terms of goals per game (3.09) — it is somewhat surprising that Brighton & Hove Albion’s victory over Tottenham Hotspur on Thursday was its first 4-2 result.

But that final scoreline arguably doesn’t reflect Brighton’s dominance. Tottenham’s goals were late consolations in the final 10 minutes of normal time and in the process of scoring four times, Brighton also hit a post with a James Milner curler. This was an excellent, confident performance from Roberto De Zerbi’s side, who — as ever — had a clever plan and executed it well.

De Zerbi’s system was, in basic terms, a midfield diamond. Danny Welbeck joined Joao Pedro up front, with Facundo Buonanotte in the No 10 position, and then Milner and Pascal Gross tucked in on either side of Billy Gilmour.

This shape made it easier for Brighton to press when Ange Postecoglou’s visitors were looking to play out from the back.

Both Joao Pedro and Welbeck are hard-working centre-forwards who are happy enough out wide, so they were content to follow Emerson Royal and Ben Davies, full-backs deployed as makeshift centre-backs because of injuries, when they split towards the flanks.

In that situation, Tottenham usually drop one of their central midfielders into the middle of the defence, and in this system, Buonanotte was in the right position to follow Pape Matar Sarr around. Brighton, therefore, often pressed three-against-three.

Spurs tried to get around this problem by dropping their other central midfielder, Pierre-Emile Hojbjerg, into defence, too. But this prompted Gross to step forward and shut him down.

So, often things ended up in the situation below — four-versus-four, with centre-forwards tracking centre-backs out wide and central midfielders against central midfielders.

Tottenham goalkeeper Guglielmo Vicario, usually assured with his distribution, was forced into longer passes than we’re used to seeing from him and often conceded possession. This attempted diagonal for Son Heung-min, for example, was badly overhit and meant Brighton could start their build-up play again.

Gross’ responsibility to move forward and shut down one of the central midfielders meant Dejan Kulusevski, playing as Tottenham’s No 10 in a 4-2-3-1, often dropped into that zone to offer the option of a forward pass to feet.

This could have caused Brighton problems, but they responded aggressively with Jan Paul van Hecke coming out from his centre-back position and sticking to Kulusevski tightly. This happened in the opening seconds…

…again after four minutes…

…and, after 16 minutes, the same thing happened.

Kulusevski rushes his pass, Hojbjerg can’t control it…

…the ball bounces nicely for Gilmour, and Brighton are on the attack…

…with Joao Pedro cutting inside to have a decent effort at goal.

Throughout the first half, Tottenham’s build-up play wasn’t working and Brighton were stealing the ball early and creating chances.

Incidentally, Brighton also dropped a midfielder into the back line to help with their build-up play, but they did so in a different manner.

Gross would move from his right-centre midfield role to right-back to receive a pass, with actual right-back Jack Hinshelwood pushing higher up the pitch. Brighton generally looked to play out to the right and although it wasn’t always entirely successful, with possession turned over a couple of times, Tottenham’s press was disjointed.

In possession, Brighton shifted from a diamond to something approaching a 3-1-6.

Left-back Igor Julio tucked in to become a third centre-back, the players on the outside points of the diamond — Milner and Gross — moved forward into the channels, while Hinshelwood also pushed on to become the sixth attacker. He’s not quite visible in the below image — his approximate position has been highlighted in the bottom-right corner — but this was often their shape in possession.

Early on, here is an example of Brighton attacking with a front five.

Welbeck has the ball on the left, with Gilmour inside, having briefly swapped roles with Milner and three others in the centre. Hinshelwood, at the bottom of the screen, isn’t involved in this move — but, ominously for Spurs, there’s space for him to exploit.

And here is an almost identical situation six minutes later, which led to the opener.

It is Joao Pedro on the ball out on the left and this time Hinshelwood has pushed forward to become the sixth attacker. Tottenham, in fairness, actually have six players along their defensive line, too, but they are inevitably sucked across towards the ball. Gross is calling for a cross in the middle, but the dangermen are the two team-mates nearer the camera.

The goal is actually very simple — Joao Pedro cuts inside, slaloms past a couple of challenges and then plays the ball over to Hinshelwood. It was a centre-forward assisting a right-back. Or, in a different sense, it was the outside-left teeing up the outside-right on opposite sides of a six-man attack.

Hinshelwood’s shot is unusual — hammered high above Vicario rather than either side of him, and the young right-back looked somewhat surprised that the ball went in.

From there, the floodgates opened.

Subsequent goals weren’t entirely interesting in a tactical sense — two Joao Pedro penalties and a superb long-range strike by Pervis Estupinan on his long-awaited return from injury.

The pick of the other ‘goals’ was actually one that was disallowed, when Welbeck crossed for Buonanotte’s run in behind and he finished with a clinical half-volley. He had made his run too early and was caught offside, but it was another example of how many players Brighton got into attack.

Here, albeit with Gross a little deeper and not sprinting fast enough to become a true participant, it’s the same six players in attack as on Hinshelwood’s goal.

The two late concessions were significant. Not only did they reduce Brighton’s margin of victory, they also mean they still haven’t kept a clean sheet this season, which is something of a failing as we reach its midway point.

But that’s part of De Zerbi’s calculation: his system is about high risk, high pressing and, on this occasion, six attackers high up the pitch.

When it all comes together, Brighton can outplay anyone.

(Photo: Gareth Fuller/PA Images via Getty Images)